From Boole to Leggett-Garg: Epistemology of Bell-type Inequalities by Hess, Karl et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
5.
04
88
7v
2 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
23
 M
ay
 20
16
✐
✐
“pap1vs3” — 2018/9/9 — 10:26 — page 1 — #1
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
From Boole to Leggett-Garg: Epistemology of
Bell-type Inequalities
Karl Hess ∗, Hans De Raedt †, Kristel Michielsen ‡
∗Center for Advanced Study, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois,† Zernike Institute for Advanced Materials, University of Groningen, Nijenborgh 4, NL-9747 AG Groningen,
The Netherlands , and ‡ Institute for Advanced Simulation, Ju¨lich Supercomputing Centre, Forschungszentrum Ju¨lich, D-52425 Ju¨lich, RWTH Aachen University, D-52056
Aachen, Germany
Member submission to the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
In 1862, George Boole derived an inequality for variables, now known
as Boolean variables, that in his opinion represents a demarcation line
between possible and impossible experience. This inequality forms
an important milestone in the epistemology of probability theory and
probability measures.
In 1985 Leggett and Garg derived a physics related inequality, math-
ematically identical to Boole’s, that according to them represents
a demarcation between macroscopic realism and quantum mechan-
ics. Their formalism, constructed for the magnetic flux of SQUIDS,
includes general features and applies also to many other quantum
experiments.
We show that a wide gulf, a wide divide, separates the “sense impres-
sions” and corresponding data, as well as the postulates of macro-
scopic realism, from the mathematical abstractions that are used to
derive the inequality of Leggett-Garg. If the gulf can be bridged,
one may indeed derive the said inequality, which is then clearly a de-
marcation between possible and impossible experience: it cannot be
violated and is not violated by quantum theory. We deduce from this
fact that a violation of the Leggett-Garg inequality does not mean
that the SQUID-flux is not there when nobody looks, as Leggett-
Garg suggest, but instead that the probability measures may not be
what Leggett-Garg have assumed them to be, when no data can be
secured that directly relate to them. We show that similar consid-
erations apply to other well known quantum interpretation-puzzles
including that of the two-slit experiment.
Bell Inequality | Leggett-Garg Inequality | Foundations of Quantum Mechanics
| Foundations of probability
In 1985, Leggett and Garg [1] wrote: “Despite sixty yearsof schooling in quantum mechanics, most physicists have a
very non-quantum mechanical notion of reality at the macro-
scopic level, which implicitly makes two assumptions. (A1)
Macroscopic realism: A macroscopic system with two or more
macroscopically distinct states available to it will at all times
be in one or the other of these states. (A2) Noninvasive mea-
surability at the macroscopic level: It is possible, in princi-
ple, to determine the state of the system with arbitrary small
perturbation on its subsequent dynamics.” Leggett and Garg
continue to state that: “ ...the experimental predictions of the
conjunction of (A1) and (A2) are incompatible with those of
quantum mechanics...”. We note here that Leggett and Garg
later added conditions other than (A1) and (A2) which are
related to counterfactual realism. We discuss counterfactual
reasoning and Bell’s theorem in a separate paper [2].
Now, thirty years later, after ninety years of schooling in
quantum mechanics, a significant body of work has been ded-
icated to quantum superposition states and entanglement.
Nevertheless, there are still many physicists that do not feel at
ease with the notion of quantum superposition at the macro-
scopic level. It is the purpose of the present paper to show that
(A1) and the data interpreted by using (A1) are still separated
by a wide gulf from the mathematical abstractions and axioms
used in the derivation of the Leggett-Garg inequality. This fact
was already recognized by Boole in 1862 [3], who investigated
the connection between data and mathematical abstractions
representing them. He showed that data could be understood
by using mathematical abstractions within a logical frame-
work involving probability. His framework is based on using
“ultimate alternatives” of possible outcomes, which are known
since as Boolean variables. Epistemologically speaking, Boole
thus linked the data (sense impressions) with the world of
“ideas” to form a consistent whole. A necessary mathemat-
ical addition in this “work-over” of the data are probability
measures attached to the ultimate alternatives, which are ini-
tially unknowns and, as we will see in some cases unknowable.
For the latter reason, Boole asked himself the question how
one could be sure, how one could know, that one had indeed
arrived at the correct ultimate possible alternatives and their
probability measures. In the course of answering the ques-
tion, he obtained his inequality. A violation of the inequality
suggested to him that he had to look for different “ultimate
alternatives” and different probability measures, in order to
do justice to the complexity of the data.
Probability theory and Boole’s inequality
Boole distinguished clearly (i) events, occurrences of physi-
cal nature that are recorded as data by notebook-entries such
as Dn with n = 1, 2, 3... and (ii) mathematical abstractions
that describe these data in the form of two-valued variables
Qm = ±1 (with m = 1, 2, 3...) representing ultimate possible
alternatives, for example “true” or “false”, up or down, head
or tail and the like. He then established a one to one corre-
spondence of data Dn and mathematical abstractions Qm and
assigned yet unknown probability measures, real numbers of
the interval [0, 1], to these ultimate possible alternatives and
combinations thereof.
Boole’s general procedure to eliminate these unknown prob-
ability measures to obtain the conditions of possible experience
for the Qs is rather complex, but he presented also an example
for only three variables Q1, Q2, Q3.
1
In this example, he assumed the existence of probability
measures µ, ν... with 0 ≤ µ, ν... ≤ 1 for singles, pairs and
triples of Q1, Q2, Q3. He then eliminated these unknowns
µ, ν... by use of logics and algebra and obtained among other
Reserved for Publication Footnotes
1 Boole [3] used x, y, z instead of Q1, Q2, Q3 and gave on page 230 a specific example that
included the derivation of inequalities and equalities related to x, y, z.
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results the inequality:
〈Q1Q2〉+ 〈Q1Q3〉+ 〈Q2Q3〉 ≥ −1, [1]
where 〈·〉 denotes the average. Below we also will use the nota-
tion Kij = 〈QiQj〉, with i, j = 1, 2, 3... introduced by Leggett
and Garg.
This inequality for the averages, may also be re-stated for
the Boolean variables themselves, if and only if the existence
of single, as well as pair and triple joint probabilities for
Q1, Q2, Q3 is guaranteed:
Q1Q2 +Q1Q3 +Q2Q3 ≥ −1. [2]
An extensive and mathematically precise derivation of the in-
equalities as related to Boole’s original paper has been given
in [4]. Inequality Eq. (1) was also given by Leggett and
Garg [1]. They assumed that the existence of all probabilities
including single-, as well as joint pair- and joint triple- proba-
bilities follows immediately from (A1). (A1) tells us that the
results for the SQUID flux resembles coins inasmuch as these
can only fall on heads or tails. The existence of probability
measures and the use of algebra for the outcomes of exper-
iments, however, requires much more as we are showing in
detail.
In recent work [5], it is claimed that it is already Eq. (2),
which is often named after Leggett-Garg, that forms accord-
ing to their 1985 paper a “constraint” to measurement re-
sults. They do, unfortunately, not specify how the mathe-
matical symbols Q1, Q2, Q3 of their equation are defined. Our
symbols in Eq. (2) are Boole-type variables. Knee et al treat
Q1, Q2, Q3 of Eq. (2) as if they were outcomes of measure-
ments stating that Legett-Garg “considered Q1, Q2, Q3 as the
value taken by a macroscopic observable Q measured at three
consecutive times t1, t2, t3 respectively.” Clearly, if we assume
that we measure triples, such as Q1 = +1, Q2 = −1, Q3 = −1,
and if we form inequalities Eq. (2) from these triples (i.e. we
use each measured value twice), then Eq. (2) follows immedi-
ately from (A1) and cannot be violated, except if elementary
algebra is violated (see also Ref. [6]). If, on the other hand,
the Qi in Eq. (2) are taken from different runs of experiments
but still represent values of measurements, then those with the
same index need to have the same value. Again, a violation is
not possible. Only if we use the same symbol Qi for different
values (which is algebraically not permitted) may we have a
violation.
From this fact we conclude that Leggett-Garg as well as
Knee et al. must have considered Q1, Q2, Q3 to be just pos-
sible two valued outcomes of measurements, in other words
some form of variables as opposed to values of these variables.
In this case the single- as well as joint pair- and triple- proba-
bilities of Q1, Q2, Q3 do not follow from (A1) and the claim of
Leggett-Garg that they do is false. To demonstrate this fact
on the basis of Boole’s work is the main topic of this paper.
Boole realized that the “looking” at raw data and developing
a view involving probability theory, involves the working-over
of the raw data and the introduction of concepts. He real-
ized that the connection of the events of nature to numbers
is nontrivial. One must be able to treat the Qs in a logical
fashion and subject them to the logical connections AND, OR
and NOT. The Qs need to be Boolean-type variables. Only
in this complex way could Boole bridge the gulf between raw
data and the algebra of numbers. This bridge led also to the
inequalities Eqs. (1) and (2). In case of a violation of the
inequality, Boole suggested that one must question the choice
of the ultimate alternatives, the existence and value of their
probability measures, or both.
In contrast to Boole, Leggett-Garg took it for granted that
their Qs could be subjected to the logical connections AND,
OR and NOT. They also claimed that the existence of all prob-
ability measures was a direct consequence of postulate (A1).
They were then left with only one option to explain a viola-
tion of the inequality. They abandoned macroscopic realism
and questioned the nature of the Qs as ultimate alternatives
by involving the concept of “superposition of states”. This
concept, naturally, directed them directly to the Hilbert space
of quantum theory as the only alternative, because no algebra
of numbers admits a superposition of ±1.
However, as we will see there are also ways within the frame-
work of macroscopic realism and “classical” probability theory
to explain or avoid inequality-violations. These include the use
of a countable infinite number of variables or indexes, which
then also necessitate the use of different probability measures.
Importantly, depending on whether pairs or triples are mea-
sured, in the pair case the existence of joint triple proba-
bilities is not necessarily guaranteed and becomes a separate
question.
It took a century until Boole’s inequality from 1862 was
rediscovered and reformulated in a very general form by
Vorob’ev [7] in 1962, who based all of his considerations on
Kolmogorov’s framework. Boole’s variables became now Kol-
mogorov’s random variables with a possible range of −1 ≤
Q1, Q2, Q3 ≤ +1. Vorob’ev discovered the importance of what
he called a cyclicity when describing criteria that determine
correlations of events by a Kolmogorov probability space. For
the exact meaning of the word cyclicity we refer the reader to
the original work of Vorob’ev. For the reasoning in the present
paper it is sufficient to recognize the cyclicity from the follow-
ing fact exhibited by Eq. (2): The values of the products of
variables in the first two terms determine entirely the values of
these variables in the last term. This specific form of cyclicity
was already introduced in the work of Boole.
The interesting corollary of Vorob’ev’s work is that given
any number of variables Q one always can invoke some
topological-combinatorial cyclicity that then restricts the pos-
sible choices of the correlations of a general set of data. If one
wishes to avoid such restrictions entirely, one needs to use an
at least countable infinite number of variables Q. This is ac-
complished in the Kolmogorov framework by the introduction
of stochastic processes, sequences of random variables labelled
by time or space-time. The use of general space-time depen-
dent stochastic processes to remove Vorob’ev cyclicities has
been discussed in [8] and, in connection with counterfactual
definiteness in [2]. Below we discuss the specific stochastic pro-
cess introduced by Leggett-Garg in relation to their inequality.
Connecting Boole-Leggett-Garg
John Stuart Bell was next to discover independently an in-
equality similar to Eq. (1). Bell’s set of assumptions and pos-
tulates were different from those discussed here and included
the postulate of counterfactual definiteness [9]. Counterfactual
realism was also invoked by Leggett-Garg in a defense of their
original paper [10]. They used the word “induction” including
a counterfactual explanation. We show in a separate paper [2]
that the mathematically precise use of counterfactual definite-
ness moves the demarcation line that the inequality represents
far away from anything related to macroscopic realism. Here,
we continue to restrict ourselves to the demarcations of the
inequality based on postulates (A1), (A2).
To illustrate their quantum view of reality, and to contrast
this view to the world-view of Einstein, Leggett and Garg
considered experiments involving rf-SQUIDS, superconduct-
ing quantum interference devices. These are superconducting
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rings containing one or more tunneling junctions. Leggett and
Garg state that quantum mechanics predicts for the magnetic
flux of such a device to oscillate back and forth between two
or more macroscopically distinct states. A simpler example
of a macroscopic two-state system would be exploded and un-
exploded gun powder, where it is clear that the system will
be most of the time in one of the two states. From footnote
2 of Leggett and Garg [1], one deduces that some might rea-
son against such a simple analogy, and there may be reasons
that the detailed physics of the magnetic flux characterizing
these macroscopic states of SQUIDS is more complicated. We
will not deal with these problems, however, and stipulate that
Leggett and Garg indeed may describe the magnetic flux of the
SQUID by two possible macroscopic states such as the head
or the tail of a coin, which validates postulate (A1). Claiming
that the existence of all the Qs probability measures (includ-
ing joint triple probabilities) follows immediately from (A1),
Leggett and Garg proceeded to deduce the inequality, formally
identical to Boole’s as given by Eq. (1).
In their proof, Leggett and Garg proposed the following
Gedanken-experiment that they claimed could actually be per-
formed. They consider many rf SQUDS, a whole ensemble of
them, with unspecified location (space coordinate). With each
single one they propose to perform a “preparation” at time t0
and subsequently measure at successive times t1, t2, ...., ti, ...
to obtain results Qt1 = D1, Qt2 = D2, . . . at the respective
times. This definition could indeed represent a general (count-
able infinite) stochastic process of Kolmogorov-type and re-
move the Vorob’ev cyclicity (the restrictions on the correla-
tions of the data). In actuality, however, Leggett-Garg use
only three times t1, t2, t3 for their proofs and do not distin-
guish the SQUIDS by their location (space coordinates). They
assume that for all SQUIDS of their ensemble measurements
can be performed precisely at these three times. No distinc-
tion of the SQUIDS is permitted that results from their spa-
cial position and possible interactions with the other SQUIDS.
All SQUIDS are being treated as identical except for the dis-
tinction with respect to the three measurement times. In
Kolmogorov’s language, the data arising from all the differ-
ent SQUDS are described by one stochastic process with only
three times t1, t2, t3 to label the random variables.
Macroscopic Reality and Leggett-Garg deductions from (A1).
Leggett and Garg claim then: “It immediately follows from
(A1) that for an ensemble of systems prepared in some way
at t0, we can define (i) joint probability densities...for Q to
have the values Qti at times ti...(ii) correlation functions
Ki,j ≡ 〈QtiQtj 〉.” Their joint probability densities involve pair
and also triple probability densities for Qt1 , Qt2 , Qt3 .
One must pause here for a moment to grasp the extent of
this claim. Leggett and Garg do not consider how far re-
moved the concepts of joint probabilities (a product of human
thought, human logics and mathematical definitions) are from
the results of sense impressions, from the data D1, D2, D3, ....
(A1) just tells us that there exist data arising from the record-
ing of two distinct sense impressions such as the heads or tails
of coins and that we are sure that heads or tails are the only
possible results of our sense impressions. There is absolutely
no direct connection of the data to the joint probabilities of
the Qs, mathematical idealizations of ultimate possible alter-
natives or Kolmogorov’s random variables and their assumed
algebra and probability measures. Only if we have accepted all
the facts of definition, logic and algebra as well as a one to one
correspondence of data and the two-valuedQ-variables, can we
possibly check whether the data are commensurate with our
conceptual thinking. In addition, there is the question what
actually is measured and which ultimate alternatives describe
the measurements. Are we measuring pairs or triples? As
we will see instantly, this latter question adds a significant
complication.
As a preview of these complications, consider the follow-
ing. From the viewpoint of quantum mechanics the SQUID is
assumed to be in a superposition of two flux-states of which
one is realized with a certain probability, say one half. Be-
cause of considerations of entanglement, however, the proba-
bility changes as soon as the entangled partner has been mea-
sured. This shows that we are dealing quantum mechanically
with conditional probability measures that now must be rep-
resented by different ultimate alternatives. Clearly one also
needs to admit alternatives more complex than Qt1 , Qt2 , Qt3
within a classical, Einstein type framework. The way this can
be done is shown below and relates to dynamics and general
stochastic processes.
Leggett-Garg deductions from (A1) plus (A2).Leggett and
Garg were neither aware of Boole’s nor of the later work by
Vorob’ev. They simply claimed that the existence of all joint
probabilities follows immediately from (A1). The postulate
(A2) just allows them to take a measurement without influ-
encing the system and thus they believe that (A2) links their
theory to the experiments. As we can see from the details of
their proposed measurements, we have the following choices:
(i) Measure the triples of outcomes at the three times t1, t2, t3
and for each of the SQUIDS of the ensemble, which are
numbered by k = 1, 2, 3.... For each triple and correspond-
ing k we have a Boole inequality:
Q
k
t1
Q
k
t2
+Qkt1Q
k
t3
+Qkt2Q
k
t3
≥ −1. [3]
Here we are using the three variables to describe precisely
the kth SQUID at three different times. This inequality
cannot be violated in any way, not by any interaction or
even “spooky” influence. The inequality is, therefore, also
true for the average over all k. In this case, the joint proba-
bilities for triples are well defined and the inequality follows
indeed from (A1). It cannot be violated and is not violated
by quantum theory [4,11].
(ii) Measure for each SQUID just a pair of outcomes, not the
triple. For example we could measure for k = 1 the pair
of outcomes corresponding to t1 and t2, for k = 2 the pair
corresponding to t1 and t3 and so forth. No triples are mea-
sured. In this case, the Boole inequality does not follow
from (A1) and it does not even follow from the conjunction
of (A1) and (A2), because now the expectation values are
determined by:
Q
i
t1
Q
i
t2
+Qmt1Q
m
t3
+Qnt2Q
n
t3
≥ −3. [4]
Here we have involved three SQUIDS of the ensemble,
distinguished by the location-related labels i = 1, 4, . . .,
m = 2, 5, . . ., and n = 3, 6, . . ., each used for measurements
at two different times. The joint triple events for any given
SQUID are not measured and it is unknown and unknow-
able (see physical reason below) which triple probability, if
any exists at all, applies to the SQUID related to a given
pair. Therefore, the pair correlation-functions and expecta-
tion values may now be arbitrarily chosen from the domain
−1 ≤ Ki,j ≤ +1, because all the factors are, at least in
principle, different and so are, therefore, all the ultimate
alternatives and corresponding probability measures.
How can one physically justify the introduction of so many
more ultimate alternatives? There are two ways of justifica-
tion. First, for each single SQUID we have chosen now one of
the three combinations Qit1Q
i
t2
, Qmt1Q
m
t3
, Qnt2Q
n
t3
and for each
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of these pairs we have a different combination of time-like sep-
arations from the preparation time t0. This fact opens the
possibility of a different dynamics for each of the three com-
binations, because of their time like differences. Second, in
addition, each SQUID is space-like separated from all other
SQUIDS and is, therefore in a different environment with re-
spect to the possible interactions of all SQUIDS. This interac-
tion also depends, in general, on the actual choice of time-like
separations of the measurements of each SQUID and is cer-
tainly different for pair and triple measurements.
Dynamics that may be underlying such types of experiments
have recently been discussed by Bush et al. [12]. We hazard no
guess whether any of the dynamics discussed by him may be
identified as actual possibilities. We emphasize, however, that
according to our understanding of the present work and that
of [2] no quantum non-locality is required and all is Einstein
local.
Additional physical justification of violations may be pos-
sible because of certain problems with the noninvasive mea-
surability at the macroscopic level, as formulated in postulate
(A2), which may clearly be violated as is well known from the
Copenhagen school, because of the atomistic structure of the
measurement equipment. Even if we now measure a macro-
scopic flux and are able to make the measurement equipment
smaller and smaller to not disturb that flux, one may run into
the inverse problem: How does the macroscopic flux of all
SQUDS influence the smaller and smaller measurement equip-
ment? In the final analysis both the SQUID and the measure-
ment equipment do have atomistic structure and intricate dy-
namics [13] and, as even Einstein admitted [14], moving away
from a statistical description of physical phenomena may be
impossible.
The actual experiments proposed by Leggett-Garg have
never been performed or presented to the authors knowledge.
A variety of related experiments have been performed and
linked to the Leggett-Garg paper. Experiments with Caesium
atoms have been presented by Robens et al. and references to
other related experiments are cited by them [15]. These exper-
iments cannot, at least in the opinion of the present authors,
prove anything about borders between quantum and classi-
cal reality, because they use the assumption of Leggett-Garg
that probability measures for singles, pairs and triples of mea-
surements follow immediately from (A1). As described above
there exists an enormous gulf, an enormous rift between (A1)
and the probability measures of the Qs and one cannot even
guarantee from (A1) that the Qs follow some algebra such as
the Boolean algebra. The Qs that are used by Robens et al.
may not represent the ultimate possible alternatives and an
underlying dynamics may require a formidable extension of
the set of ultimate alternatives.
General quantum experiments and Leggett-Garg
The facts discussed in (i) and (ii) above, highlight the well
known conundrum of some interpretations of quantum me-
chanics. If we measure triples, we cannot violate the inequal-
ity [3]. On the other hand, if we measure pairs, quantum
mechanics tells us that the inequality is violated under certain
circumstances. Leggett and Garg conclude from the fact that
measuring pairs may yield a violation of the inequality and
from their assumption of noninvasive measurement that any
experimentally demonstrated violation denies the “existence”
of possible outcomes that are not measured and proves quan-
tum superposition in our space and time system (as opposed
to being just a mathematical tool involving Hilbert space).
Therefore it appears to the authors that Leggett-Garg have
answered the question stated in the title of their paper [1] (“Is
the flux there when nobody looks”) in the negative.
Peres stated in the same connection “unperformed experi-
ments have no results”.
Knowing the works of Boole and Vorob’ev, however, we do
not need to go as far as doubting the presence of macroscopic
or even atomistic objects depending on whether or not we
“look”. Boole tells us for the case of a violation that we have
not arrived at an understanding involving the ultimate possi-
ble alternatives. We must choose more or different variables
than just Qt1 , Qt2 , Qt3 and we may need a stochastic process
involving a countable infinite number of functions to remove
all possible Vorob’ev cyclicities. In more elementary terms,
we must abandon our ideas of joint triple probability mea-
sures when we are not measuring the data in triples but only
in pairs. We thus just may need to abandon our mathematical
constructs, when the data are not commensurate with them.
The above conundrum is, of course, present in many dis-
cussions of quantum-type experiments and is generally just
not expressed as clearly as in the case of the Leggett-Garg
Gedanken-experiment. Key to the understanding of the co-
nundrum is the fact that it arises from an unphysical invo-
cation of joint occurrences or events and corresponding triple
probability-measures. This fact has been covered in the past
from various points of view by [11,16–25].
In the above example it is the assumption of the existence of
sequential triple events and probability measures, while only
pair events are actually measured for each SQUID and a cor-
responding pair sample space must be constructed. If triple-
measurements are not made and, if instead, we deal with
different sequential pair measurements at different locations,
then a dynamic interaction of all SQUIDS with different in-
teractions in different neighborhoods leads to Eq. (4) and no
obvious conundrum arises.
As another example for the unphysical invocation of joint
occurrences or events and corresponding joint probability mea-
sures, consider the following known facts of the two-slit exper-
iment. We know that one measures an interference pattern
on some detector-screen if both slits are open and that this
pattern is not even remotely equal to the sum of the patterns
created with only one slit open at a time. One quantum-theory
explanation is that the particle is only there, in one particular
slit, if one is looking. If one is not, then it is in a superposition
state, meaning in essence it exists simultaneously within the
confinement of both slits.
How can we resolve this situation in terms of Boole’s prob-
ability? We must assume that there exists a dynamics that
we do not observe and maybe cannot observe in its entirety.
However, the following facts alone permit an interpretation in
terms of Boole-type probability theory. A photon or electron
(or any quantum entity that approaches the two slits) starts
“shaking” all the particles constituting the material defining
the slits and causes a many body “mayhem”, a dynamics of all
the involved particles and gauge fields. It does not matter for
the following argument whether we describe that shakeup by
the most modern quantum mechanical methods or by the the-
oretical tools and methods that Einstein used. This shakeup is
naturally dynamically different if the particle approaches only
one open slit than it is when we have two open slits.
Denote by Qk1ti the screen detection at time ti and position
sk for the case when only the first slit is open. Furthermore
use Qk2tm for the screen detection at time tm when only the
second slit is open and finally Qk12tn for time tn when both slits
are open. There is a fundamental problem connected to any
reasoning that combines probabilities of these occurrences in
4 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0709640104 Footline Author
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one equation, because they happen under different physical
conditions. Yet Feynman and Hibbs [26] teach that classical
physics results in a “chance” of occurrence for the two-slit case
that equals the sum of the chances of the one slit cases. Thus
they maintain that:
〈Qk1ti 〉+ 〈Q
k2
tm
〉 = 〈Qk12tn 〉, [5]
where the averages 〈·〉 are taken over all i,m, n.
However, make the reasonable assumption that the parti-
cles and fields constituting the slit(s) exhibit an Einstein-local
many body dynamics. It is obvious then that this dynam-
ics (including, for example, surface plasmons involving the
slit material) is different when different numbers of slits are
present and we must have in general:
〈Qk1ti 〉+ 〈Q
k2
tm
〉 6= 〈Qk12tn 〉. [6]
It is then not classical probability theory that is incompat-
ible with quantum [26], but it is the use of incorrect assump-
tions about classical probability measures (Feynman and Hi-
bbs used the word “chance” without precise definition) that
leads to a conundrum [27]. Note that our notation is based
on Boole-Kolmogorov with a corresponding space of events in
mind. The difference of having one and two slits open plays,
therefore, a major role [28].
Our reasoning just is that one cannot oversimplify or dis-
tort macroscopic realism by assuming the existence of mea-
surements conditional to the joint occurrence of events that
cannot jointly occur (thus technically involving conditioning
on impossible events, a probabilistic no no). To avoid con-
tradictions and quantum nonlocalities (as opposed to Einstein
locality), one further needs to include dynamic many body
interactions in the slit material that quantum theory does
not require, because it somehow efficiently circumvents them
by using probability amplitudes and Hilbert space instead of
probability measures.
If we attempt to develop a space-time picture without in-
volving Hilbert space, we must admit general many body
stochastic processes, in order to avoid conundrums of the kind
described above. We are convinced that most physicists will
agree that one may regard the slit material as a many body
quantum mechanical system, consisting of particles and fields
that interact with the incoming particles and fields. Natu-
rally, we understand that the complete (classical or quantum)
many-body treatment of equipment and environment (includ-
ing the observer) leads to an infinite regress that has to be
cut-off like a Gordian knot at some point. It is, however, also
our opinion that imposing such a cut-off on “classical” type of
thinking when performing Leggett-Garg-type proofs, is lead-
ing physics down the wrong path and presents conundrums
that are artificial.
The authors are convinced that these conundrums are a con-
sequence of some hidden dynamics that is in its essence cov-
ered by the formalism of quantum mechanics which provides
us with suitable long term averages in spite of the very simpli-
fied description of the measurement equipment. The conun-
drum arises only if we “derive” from these long term averages
probability measures for certain oversimplified variables (that
do not represent the ultimate logical alternatives that some
believe they are). It is not that the alternatives do not exist
when we are not looking. We maintain that the probabil-
ity measures that are assigned in Leggett-Garg-type proofs to
these supposedly ultimate alternatives are just incorrect and a
much larger number as well as more complicated alternatives
will exist and must be used.
Leggett and Garg did realize soon after publication of their
1985 paper [1] that their reasoning was not air-tight and pro-
posed later the inclusion of another postulate that is related to
counterfactual realism [10]. The problems with this postulate
are discussed in a separate paper [2].
Conclusion
Thus, if we follow the probability theory of Boole carefully,
no quantum conundrum arises. We only need to postulate
that we have not arrived at the precise ultimate alternatives
and their probability measures. Different physics related la-
bels may characterize the Qs and we cannot attach probability
measures and postulate the existence of joint probabilities if
the data do not support the existence of such joint proba-
bilities. The same reasoning applies to approaches using the
probability theory of Kolmogorov. We just need to remove
the Vorob’ev cyclicities by use of stochastic processes and in-
troduce additional space and time (or space-time) labels for
the Qs in order to avoid conflicts with quantum theory.
For the example of the two-slit experiment, this means
that we cannot assign probability measures for detection on
a screen by considering each single slit separately and inde-
pendently. If both slits are open, the many body interactions
of incoming particles and fields with the quantum entities of
the slit-material necessitate different indexing and time labels
for the cases of two slits simultaneously open or just one slit
open during separate and different time periods. The question
through which slit a particle propagates is more appropriately
replaced by the question which many body interactions the
incoming particle undergoes.
We are convinced that the well known “one liner” of Peres
“unperformed experiments have no results” must be replaced
by: “ For unperformed experiments, we cannot assign prob-
ability measures to oversimplified ultimate alternatives (Kol-
mogorov random variables), or even postulate the existence
of these probability measures, which may have nothing to do
with macroscopic realism”.
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